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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how decisions are made and justified within cultures of 
contribution using an ‘operational pragmatics.’Peer-production and contribution 
cultures are enfolded in a dynamic of resistance and appropriation in relation to 
capitalism. Open-source and contribution-based cultural processes have been 
critiqued as tending towards bureaucracy or becoming enfolded in a never-ending 
neoliberal imaginary from which escape or transcendence become impossible. An 
examination of the values expressed within a peer-production community challenges 
these perspectives and shows how ‘operational pragmatics’ can provide moral 
justifications both through reference to matters of principle and of design. Conflating 
these matters complicates claims about the inherent ‘virtues of participation, 
especially in technical cultures. A qualitative analysis of an open-source hardware 
project shows how competing moral justifications unfold, and how the challenges that 
they pose to capitalism may be tenuous because of the way that justificatory regimes 
work within technology development under capitalism.  
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Introduction 
 
Peer-production and contribution cultures are enfolded in a dynamic of resistance and 
appropriation in relation to capitalism. The expansion of participatory media 
production processes, including free and open software development and voluntary 
sharing of cultural work, have sparked interest in how these forms of collaborative 
work develop social, cultural and economic value. These cultures include peer-
production practices that influenced development of free and open source software 
(FOSS) (Weber, 2006) before expanding to be used in hardware  development 
(Powell, 2015a) and other cultural products (Jenkins, 2006). Despite continuing 
concerns about the exploitative aspects of contributed ‘free’ labour (Terranova 2000) 
scholars of innovation enthusiastically embraced the idea of peer production as 
shifting working practices from hierarchy to network (Benkler, 2006), although there 
has been criticism about how contribution cultures build value for platforms 
(Gillespie, 2011) without fulfilling their potential for greater democratic participation 
(Mansell, 2012, Powell 2016). Indeed, it now seems that peer-production has 
integrated some of the critiques of capitalism and, in some instances, become an 
exemplar of the new spirit of capitalism focused on project-based work (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005). Peer-production projects are also engaged in the creation of 
accessible knowledge and - at least for some - accessible technology. How can these 
competing aims be held together? What does this imply for the ongoing shifts in the 
production of technology, knowledge, and culture?  
 
This paper examines how participants in peer production processes sustain competing 
moral visions for their participation. I argue that moral justifications based on the 
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ideal design and use of technologies can become conflated with normative claims 
about principles of peer production or accessibility of technology. I follow 
discussions on an open source project, analysing how the participants position 
themselves and the future consumers of their products as both good subjects of 
capitalism and as advocates of openness and flexibility. Through reference to what I 
refer to as ‘operational pragmatics’, the set of justifications made in relation to 
function, their discussions collapse ‘good’ function of technologies, ‘good’ (or expert) 
use of them, and ‘good’ (or virtuous) principles and practices into regimes of 
justification.  
 
The moral aspects of justifications are an under-appreciated aspect of the dynamics of 
peer production in the literature. These moral aspects are important to examine 
because they challenge the idea that peer production and contribution culture 
primarily work by legitimating competitive and exploitative forms of knowledge 
production.  In this paper, I show how moral justifications do two kinds of work: 
justifying a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) and opening 
out alternatives to it. These alternatives might include considerations of whether 
technology is designed in order to be repaired (Jackson, 2014) demonstrating the 
connection between open knowledge and a restructuring of extensive market 
capitalism. I suggest that the possibility to repair a tool involves both the quality of its 
function and the openness of the knowledge used to produce it. 
 
I analyse how people working in an open source hardware project advocate for, 
negotiate, and operationalize moral perspectives.  In this community, the pragmatics 
are ‘operational’ – concerned variously with the function of tools and with the 
justification of particular decisions within a deliberative design process. I examine 
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how argument and action articulate to different moral qualities. These moral qualities 
align with different ideas about the value of peer production - on one hand, its ability 
to sustain innovation in the capitalist mode and, on the other, to model the creation 
and maintenance of common knowledge and the capacity for repair. I show how 
justifications of goodness based on function can expand –and enfold arguments for 
the expansion of access to knowledge. People participating and contributing to shared 
projects negotiate multiple moral engagements that manifest not only in the material 
or symbolic contributions that they build but also in the regimes of justification that 
are constructed in language and computer code. An analysis of this pragmatics in an 
open-source project dedicated to creating an open source mobile phone at the moment 
of the launch of the iPhone reveals contradictory and intersecting justifications for 
democratic access to knowledge alongside, and in relation to, the ‘new spirit of 
capitalism’ that Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) discuss.  Participants justify choices 
pragmatically, linking ‘what works’ to ‘what is good’, making success in markets as 
important as the other virtues of peer production (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2005).  
 
 
Peer to peer values and virtues 
 
Peer production, as a form of participatory culture, includes contribution without 
direct remuneration to cultural products. Forms of peer production include free and 
open source software (FOSS) as well as alternative communication access networks  
and other information resources (Dulong de Rosnay and Musiani, 2016). Practices 
within contribution cultures are not derived from wage labour, and many of them 
create informational goods that are not strictly commercial market products, instead 
producing goods through relationships of reciprocal exchange. These features have 
suggested an association between contribution cultures and liberal values or virtues 
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(Benkler and Nissenbaum 20015). There are, however, also deeper moral 
contradictions in these practices. For example, Coleman and Golub (2006) see 
software production cultures as nourishing an expressive liberalism, rewarding 
individual contributions and arguing that the ethics of this liberalism are in constant 
negotiation. Unfortunately, the focus on liberal notions of virtue does not capture how 
these moral perspectives engage the broader tensions between market competition and 
open knowledge, suggesting that other perspectives, possibly including the ‘moral 
economy’ approaches applied in the context of cultural production by Hesmondhalgh 
(2017) and others may be fruitful. Benkler (2006) celebrates how peer production 
could contribute to the establishment of a knowledge commons that has the capacity 
to challenge the commodification of knowledge. As critiques of this position have 
pointed out, however, participatory dynamics especially in relation to software 
development are now fully integrated into the dominant institutional forms of our 
time and are enfold new spirits of capitalism including celebrations of individual 
competition and dynamic change (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). Not only do these 
new spirits of capitalism provoke different kinds of challenges to, and appropriations 
of, participatory dynamics, I suggest that these can be understood in new ways by 
focusing on how people think of their ‘goodness.’  
 
Critiques of peer-to-peer  
 
The Bureaucratic critique 
The liberal perspective on peer-to-peer (P2P) production has celebrated the capacity 
of peer-production to allow people to pursue psychologically gratifying labour, create 
egalitarian relationships and realize ethical relationships that are nonmarket and 
nonproprietary. However, Kreiss et al (2010) argue that bureaucracy, rather than 
Comment [M1]: Again, the 
‘good/goodness’ theme needs to come 
through in the conclusion 
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altruism, tends to maintain contribution cultures, and how these cultures are often 
elite and specialized. This critique arguably underplays some of the broader social 
dynamics that impact on participatory processes. The unpaid contribution of labour 
now underpins much of the platform-based communication and information 
environment (as anticipated by Terranova 2004). The bureaucratic critique also tends 
to overemphasise the democratic and disruptive dynamics of participatory processes 
which may not be completely recuperated in practice. While participation can become 
a compulsion (Couldry 2015), contemporary capitalism has also been transformed by 
its appropriation of participation (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). So, while the 
bureaucratic critique opens the possibility to see P2P processes as capable of being 
appropriated for un-democratic ends, it is also essential to push forward to understand 
how challenges to, and recuperation of human creativity within, capitalism might 
unfold simultaneously. 
  
Dialectic and Moral Critiques 
Participation can also be ambivalent and capitalism can appropriate creative energies 
to its own ends, as other critiques of peer production point out.  Grounded in Zižek’s 
(2015) claim that socialist and communist ideas have been negated by neoliberalism, 
Cammaerts (2011) that participatory practices might challenge neoliberalism by 
negating  Zizek’s negation.  However, as a dialectic perspective, this presumes an 
endpoint – and as neoliberalism perceives itself as being a synthesis (through the 'end 
of history' argument advanced by Fukuyama 1992), the endpoint becomes its 
continuation. Cammaerts explores this dynamic in relation to the challenge initially 
posed by file-sharing technologies to the music market, and the subsequent 
criminalization of these practices. In this framework, and using this example, no 
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matter how disruptive the peer-to-peer form might be for the neoliberal frame, the 
dialectic into which it is enfolded always presumes a synthesis into a new form of 
neoliberalism.  
 
 
Moral critiques and regimes of justification 
 
By contrast, other perspectives invite consideration of moral aspects of cultural 
production. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) examine the moral and emotional 
qualities that workers attach to cultural work, showing how contradictory the 
explanations and justifications about the value of work can be, mixing delight in the 
process of contributing work with frustration and anxiety at low pay and exploitation. 
The ambivalence about feelings of value in paid work highlight the contradictions and 
moral strains of life under capitalism.  Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) observations 
about the flexibility of capitalism give us a valuable conceptual lens for analyse how 
these strains are negotiated: they highlight how different regimes of justification are 
associated with various forms of social life, observing how people understand their 
actions to be good or right, and how these understandings connect with what they 
actually do. Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2000) work identifies how phases of social life 
acquire particular kinds of justification that legitimate and value particular actions. 
They describe how different social constructions work to create fragile agreements 
that maintain the tenuous balance of the social world. These ‘orders of worth’ 
establish what is viewed as legitimately ‘good’ within any social formation. This can 
change over time as Boltanski and Thévenot (2000) write, “we stress the work 
persons have to accomplish here and now in order to construct the social world, to 
endow it with meaning and to confer on it a minimum of firmness  . . . [the orders of 
worth model] aims to account for justifiable states, where justification makes an 
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appeal to common resources that go beyond the situation” (p. 212).  
 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) examine various orders of worth and justificatory 
regimes as they appear specifically in relation to a new spirit of capitalism, that sees 
natural order in the continuous development of projects and the formation of 
networks, and that sustains capitalism by positioning critiques of capitalism as 
projects that are part of its inevitable development. From a moral perspective, these 
justificatory regimes are understood to dynamically integrate different orders of 
concern. Operational pragmatics are thus ways that these concerns are ordered, 
justified and placed in relation to the function of tools and the imagined outcomes for 
developers and users. 
 
By focusing on the justification of particular acts, it is possible to see slippages 
between ‘moral’ and ‘technical’ ideas of goodness. As my case study shows, 
justifications (especially ones made on the basis of moral claims such as ‘goodness’) 
can be advanced for different sets of actions at the same time and with contradictory 
concerns: technical ‘goodness’ holds some value for the capacity for people to 
exercise their capabilities (see Nussbaum, 2001) by being able to understand or repair 
a smartphone, for example, but other forms of ‘goodness’ are more contentious. 
Market competition and commons-based knowledge creation are justified 
simultaneously, through appeals to different morals or values. My ‘operational 
pragmatics’ allows analysis of claims about goodness based on principles such as 
openness but also on technical function. I suggest that a conflation of these values can 
undermine and complicate some of the claims in the literature to the effect that peer 
production “fosters virtue by creating a context or setting that is conducive to virtuous 
engagement and practice, thereby offering a medium for inducing virtue itself in its 
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participants” (Benkler and Nissenbaum p. 403). Benkler and Nissenbaum argue that 
different clusters of virtues appear in relation to peer production: autonomy, 
independence and liberation; creativity, productivity and industry; benevolence, 
charity and generosity; and sociability, camaraderie, friendship, altruism and 
cooperation.  In this paper I examine the cluster of creativity, productivity and 
industry as well as ideas of altruism and cooperation. In many participatory processes, 
virtues and ethics are negotiated pragmatically, using both linguistic pragmatics (the 
use of grammatical resources and strategies of argumentation) and material practices 
aligned with practical goals. Coleman and Golub point this out in their observation 
that peer production facilitates “a rejection of universal ethical rules in favour of an 
approach that conceives of ethics as the practice of creating values and norms of 
action” (p. ? 2005). While Boltanski and Thévenot (2005) consider linguistic 
pragmatics in their discussion of how social perspectives are legitimated, they do not 
focus, as Benkler and Nissenbaum do, on the practical goals such as well-functioning 
technologies that often serve as legitimating reference points. This needs redress 
because the slippage between these forms of pragmatics can conflate means and ends 
and technical, political and social benefits. While technical ‘goodness’ can, in some 
cases, serve normative ends such as expanding access to knowledge or the capacity to 
resist features of market capitalism by repairing systems and devices, other notions of 
‘goodness’ can reinforce the legitimacy of capitalism. In the case study that follows, I 
examine how ‘operational pragmatics’ illuminate the conflation of ‘good’ function, 
‘good’ argument and ‘good’ morality, but also how these pragmatics open a potential 
for other ways of working, particularly through a focus on the conditions under which 
technologies can be designed to be repaired which both provides them with ‘good’ 
function and keeps knowledge about them open. 
MORAL ORDERS IN CONTRIBUTION CULTURES 10 
 
Case Study: “The World’s First Open-source Smartphone” 
In 2006 I was researching hardware hacking. One evening one of my collaborators 
started to tell me about a new project he was involved in – he was working on an open 
source project that was designing the world’s first open source smartphone. I had only 
the vaguest idea of what a smartphone was, but he told me that it would be an 
amazing device, capable of delivering video phone calls, sending email and taking 
photos. Along with hundreds of others, he was writing code and discussing the project 
on a mailing list. Best of all, he said, the community’s ideas were actually going to be 
considered in the manufacturing of this phone, because the project leader, a man 
called Sean Moss-Pulz, ran a family business in Taiwan called First International 
Computer (FIC). FIC built chipsets, and Sean was a passionate open source advocate 
who convinced his family that an open source project would mean that product 
development could happen across a worldwide group of experts and that bugs in 
prototype code would be reviewed by thousands of people. It would also create a 
built-in market of expert users. In 2007 the project, called OpenMoko, released its 
first prototype phone, timed to present an ‘open alternative to the iPhone.’ One more 
prototype was released in 2008 before Sean Moss-Pulz stepped down from the project 
and it ceased producing phones. OpenMoko is currently maintained as a volunteer-led 
repository of design schematics and software code for use in mobile devices 
 
I followed the project on its publicly-archived discussion mailing lists from February 
2007 to October 2008, and analysed list posts accessible via the Internet Archive
1
. My 
                                                 
1
I analysed posts from this period as it spanned the inception of the project through to 
the production of the first market-ready product. Due to caching issues, the list 
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analysis included thematic coding of the discourse in the form of postings and 
debates, taking the perspective that, in these cases, key discourses are collectively 
produced (Hardy et al. 2005) and dependent on the creation of particular social and 
cultural contexts (van Dijk, 2005). Participants are not identified by name here, 
although the month and year of the posting is included. In this paper, Phillips’s (2002) 
notion of a discourse as an interrelated set of texts, practices of production, 
dissemination and reception is appropriate, since the list postings create not only 
discussions, but particular ways of understanding peer-production and its value. After 
introducing how participants understood and responded to the concept of ‘openness’, 
I examine two discussions in detail, both concerning the interplay of function and 
marketability and a particular focus on definitions of openness. These took place at 
different times across the span of Moss-Pulz’s involvement in OpenMoko including 
the launch of the iPhone and the OpenMoko prototypes Neo1973 and Freerunner. The 
historical vantage point also identifies the long-term contributions of the OpenMoko 
project which influenced the Android open-source software stack and the platform 
ecology of app development for smartphones (see Powell, 2015b).  
 
Openness and its values 
Two dimensions of value co-exist and become enfolded in the OpenMoko project, one 
celebrating market success and the other open knowledge. These values are celebrated 
and co-articulated through the principle of openness. Open source electronics is an 
especially challenging case for applications of peer-production principles and, in 
particular, the ideals of open source production which stipulate (in the case of 
computer software) the accessibility of source code. Many attempts have been made 
                                                                                                                                           
archives for May, August and September 2007 were missing.  
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to apply these principles to other areas, but this has caused conflict both 
philosophically, in relation to the notion of openness (Tkacz, 2012) and, practically, in 
terms of how ‘source’ might be defined in relation to material goods (Powell, 2012). 
The design of consumer electronics and miniaturized devices also depends on 
numerous proprietary arrangements of components and non-transparent supply chains 
for the raw materials required to produce them.  Nevertheless, one of the key 
conceptual justifications for OpenMoko participants was the idea of producing a piece 
of open source technology. 
 
 
Participants were united in their enthusiasm for open source processes and products 
and paid particular attention to the philosophical aspects of the project which was 
made easier because the mailing list was open to contributions from across the 
project. Discussions tended to justify openness in terms of personal capacity – either 
the writer’s sense of himself2 as a person capable of making the most of an open 
technology (which also had the benefit of securing their status). Openness was also 
sometimes held up as being good for people who use mobile phones, but this was 
often inflected by a sense of the participants’ own expertise, which they recognized as 
exceptional but also wished to be more widespread. Most participants presented 
themselves as experienced in open source participatory projects with some identifying 
as ‘Linux experts’ in their signatures3. But even in discussions of openness, 
participation and competition seemed to collapse into each other. When one set of 
writers suggested, for example, that the OpenMoko might become an open platform 
                                                 
2
 It was not possible to know the gender of all of the list posters, but the majority used 
traditionally male names or identifiers. 
3
 Linux is a popular open-source operating system and one of the earliest and largest 
open-source software production projects.  
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for self-written applications, some suggested that this would only be valuable if the 
project adhered to the GPL open-source software license setting a higher bar for 
technical openness. Other writers thought that the main value of advocating maximum 
openness would be that it would help to compete with Palm and Nokia who were the 
main smartphone developers at the time. Most often, these musings centred on how 
‘good’ open source projects might be, understood in relation to the qualities of their 
openness and their accessibility and popularity on a global market.  These tensions 
between principle and function appeared to foreshadow how operational pragmatism 
was employed to define what would be ‘good’ or ‘better’ for the project. If even the 
broad concept of ‘openness’ contained ambivalence about ‘goodness,’ more specific 
frames of justification appeared in the posts which demonstrate how the kinds of 
virtues that have been associated with peer-production were developed pragmatically. 
The following section identifies how participants developed an ‘operational 
pragmatics’ that positioned both the normative principles of access to knowledge and 
the technical features of OpenMoko as ‘good’. I use Benkler and Nissenbaum’s 
virtues of creativity, productivity and industry to frame the discussion while allowing 
the justificatory regimes of the new spirit of capitalism to show through; particularly 
its absorption of the critiques of capitalism and a celebration of liberation, autonomy, 
participation and networked ways of working. Operational pragmatics conflate means 
and ends and the value of principles including, open contribution, open technology, 
and expertise, as well as the value of the functional smartphone object. 
 
Virtues and markets 
For OpenMoko participants, contribution to the project is frequently a subject of 
justification, and they describe their expertise as conferring responsibility for acting in 
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a particular way, and for producing ‘better’ technical tools. To return to Benkler and 
Nissenbaum’s clusters of virtues (which I find generative but perhaps too morally 
specific compared to my idea of values), ‘creativity, productivity and industry’ feature 
significantly for the OpenMoko participants. In some cases, ‘good’ participation in 
open processes is conflated with ‘good’ design of technologies and ‘good’ (or expert) 
use of them. In this (rather lengthy) exchange, developers discuss which mobile 
messaging system they think should be used in OpenMoko, straying, as often 
happens, into philosophical discussions of the expected benefits of open software for 
both their own group of experts and for society generally.  
 
This conversation, which took place in February 2007, started with a technical 
discussion of what messaging protocol the prototype phones ought to use. Like many 
other threads, it branched into discussions blending value-based declarations about 
open source, operational decisions about phone design, and validation of community 
expertise.   
 
One writer asks, rhetorically,  
 
“Who uses MMS [a mobile messaging protocol]? 
 
Another responds: 
 
> Only pretty much the majority of actual cellphone users in Europe, based on 
> the market research and carrier requirements I've read... 
 
Sean Moss-Pulz then weighs in with his view on messaging protocols and why the 
OpenMoko will not use the MMS messaging protocol: 
 
IMHO [in my humble opinion], only because nobody has given us anything 
better. We're trying to do that. So I asked the guys to ignore MMS for the now 
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[sic]. If this is an issue I'll put resources on this in the future. Right now, I'd 
much prefer to see solutions that use GPRS
4
 such as? IM / Email / ... 
 
Moss-Pulz appears to defer to the decision-making capacity of the other participants, 
as the next part of the thread shows. One participant adds: 
 
>> Seems like the typical user would just email 
>> and attach media and/or just s/ftp [command line code for file transfer] 
 
Another person responds: 
 
> Typical _Linux_ user, maybe. This is the sort of thing which (in my view) 
> represents something of a disconnect between the goals of "having as open a 
> phone as possible" and "selling a lot of phones"... 
 
Moss-Pulz again cedes authority to the community while also justifying his 
operational decision: 
 
You might be right. But I personally feel that MMS is fundamentally flawed. 
Costs aside, it's just not the way I think media should be transferred. The 
benefits are just too low for the end user. We're trying to fix this. 
 
Really guys, we're trying to rethink lots of things with OpenMoko. I don't 
want to do the same things just running under FOSS. We'd be missing out on a 
huge invitation to innovate both as a company and a community. Why not use 
the flexibility and rethink how we want these devices to work -- as end 
users -- not just for geeks but for everyone? I'm not saying we'll get 
things right the first time. Just that we're going to try our best ;-) 
                                                 
4
 The standard messaging protocol used in the United States  
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Other people in the community then step in to validate this perspective: 
 
I agree.  I have never used MMS, and very rarely use SMS [short messaging; 
the protocol for text messages].  I use email for just about any correspondence 
that I have (including to/from my phone). Now, that doesn't mean that I am a 
representation of the *average* user, but despite its drawbacks email is a much 
better means of transmitting written communication. 
 
He continues: 
 
One thing to consider is that even if we can do amazing things, we are 
still going to have to interact with people using "normal/whatever" 
phones.  So even if SMS/MMS isn't going to be the ideal platform for 
sending messages we still need to be able to send/receive them.  A 
*better* way to approach the situation is to be able to do something new 
and cool that "other" phones can't and then use that as a selling point 
for the OpenMoko/Neo. 
 
These exchanges have the result of validating design decisions as being ‘good’ if they 
align with the discursive practices of the developers themselves, validating their 
experience and expertise as determinate of ‘goodness’.  Some of these practices and 
internal values included the idea of doing ‘new and cool’ things, suggesting that the 
developers thought of themselves and the users of their phones as innovative 
technology specialists. Using reference to their own experiences and casting 
themselves as both expert and potentially representative of some idealized end-users, 
their technical solutions could help even people with ‘normal/whatever’ phones to see 
the value of their design choices. Developers struggle to balance out their appeals to 
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people like them (‘geeks’), their hopes for imagined future consumers, and their 
interpretations of the value of using FOSS methods. 
 
Another thread of exchange follows on from the final paragraph of the first message: 
 
FOSS doesn't make good software by default.  A good user community behind 
the platform has a chance at making good hardware/software.  But it is going 
to take time and a lot of effort to make great software, and Sean is right that 
we may not get it right the first time around... 
 
What I mean by not getting carried away is.  I don't think that there will 
be many situations where you can "walk into a room full of people all 
using the Neo's and...[insert cool idea]."  There were over a billion 
mobile phones shipped out in 2006, and there will be many more in 2007.  
So even if we get a million of these devices in people's hands we are 
still at less than 1 percent market penetration.  So, we can't create a 
self contained community that only looks to our selves for ideas.  We 
*must* be able to easily/effectively communicate with those other %99+ of 
devices out there...even if they are inferior.   
 
 
Open source virtues are meant to be self-evident, but OpenMoko participants 
anticipate the extension of creativity and productivity to others through the wide 
distribution of their smartphone, celebrating its superior qualities compared to other 
products. The final list posting also tempers the consensus about the quality or value 
of open-source production, noting that it does not automatically make ‘good 
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software’. It confirms that effort needs to go into creating the community and the 
conditions. This final post, the writer also tries to consider the other people who might 
be outside the core group of contributors. The writer nuances the assumptions that he 
and others might have had about the relationship between the ‘goodness’ of the 
phone’s hardware and software technology and the ‘goodness’ of the process. The 
writer of the final post in the discussion concludes: 
 
At the end of the day, this IS an Open Source project, so 
anything can be changed if necessary, but (Like a lot of other people on 
this mailing list, I imagine), I want things to be designed RIGHT, so as to 
minimize the number of re-writes we have to go through before we get 
something that can work for the wide variety of people who WILL have a 
MoKo.  
 
Here, ‘rightness’ refers to an ideal related to the process, but also to the imagined 
function of the device. “Rightness” is effective, provides a pragmatic justification in 
the context of the argument, and demonstrates an effective use of the time and talent 
of the developers. This effectiveness, grounded in flexibility and personal 
engagement, seems to align with the ideals of the new spirit of capitalism and what 
Medosch (2014) has called ‘new networked people’ who are able to mobilise and self-
motivate to work in open source projects.  
 
One of the features of the new spirit of capitalism, according to Boltanksi and 
Chiapello (2005), is the appropriation of critiques of capitalism into its ideology. 
Open Moko developers restructure themselves and their imagined future consumers 
as creators and innovators, advocates of openness and flexibility, but also as good 
MORAL ORDERS IN CONTRIBUTION CULTURES 19 
subjects of capitalism. The virtue of altruism that Benkler and Nissenbaum (2005) 
also looked for in peer-production projects are also present, but enfolded within and 
alongside the hope that the project will do well by selling lots of phones (which of 
course would be built on software ‘designed RIGHT).’ Rightness and goodness are 
also related to expertise. Judging the goodness of a design becomes more difficult, 
however, when the design is flawed or needs to be repaired. Software is inherently 
buggy, and open-source software development avoids the challenges of breakdown by 
focusing on the efficiency of distributed bug-fixing. With hardware like smartphones, 
however, the logic of repair becomes more challenging, as open-source projects 
struggle with the questions of actual accessibility of the materials and design of 
electronics hardware (Powell, 2014) as well as with the challenges that bugs and other 
breakdowns pose to the connection between ‘good’ technology and marketable 
technology.  
 
Repair and commercialization 
For the OpenMoko project, the tensions raised by bugginess emerged after the release 
of the first prototype phone. This opened up comparisons with the first iPhone, which 
was released in late 2007. When the OpenMoko phone was released, it did not work 
very well, and so the discussions on the mailing list turned from ideal features to 
proposals for repairing software (and hardware) function. This process of repair 
within the design process illustrates what Jackson (2014) describes as “an aftermath, 
growing at the margins, breakpoints, and interstices of complex sociotechnical 
systems as they creak, flex, and bend their way through time. It fills in the moment of 
hope and fear in which bridges from old worlds to new worlds are built, and the 
continuity of order, value, and meaning gets woven, one tenuous thread at a time” (p. 
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223). Allowing for repair might make it possible for both developers and imagined 
consumers to share knowledge. For the OpenMoko community, this value and 
meaning is often wound around their discussion of the ‘goodness’ of the design as 
reflected in the capacities of the people who designed it. Phones might be able to be 
repaired, but they depended on a certain sort of person to be willing to engage with 
their openness.  
 
Consider the discussion of the phone’s keyboard which some participants thought 
worked poorly. Here, usable features and software are both judged to be ‘good’ 
outcomes in part because of their flexibility. One writer recalled the design 
discussions: 
 
> If I remember correctly, “all” participants of the discussion 
> came to the conclusion, that a regular qwerty keyboard is not 
> sufficient no matter how clever you “pimp” it, due to 
> restriction of precision of finger typing and lack of screen 
> space. 
 
Another replied: 
i disagree. reality of the . . . predictive keyboard and actual use of it 
disagrees. talk and theory is fine - actual code . . .  is disagreeing. 
users of that code are disagreeing.… in the end the proof is in the pudding. 
who will go and actually write code. you can have all the ideas in the world, 
but he who puts them into code and makes them usable by others "wins" :) so 
don't stop- please, work on alternate input methods. i am going with the one i 
have seen work, demonstrated live on a Neo and used. (March 2008) 
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This argument employs a classic form of software-developer rhetoric, ‘argument-by-
technology’ (Kelty, 2005) where making a system that functions (writing ‘running 
code’ that executes a program) acts as a persuasive argument for one way of thinking 
and working. In this case, the argument also gives greater legitimacy to people 
working on the phone to make it usable, rather than simply discussing – creating a 
distinction in the group’s folk pragmatics.  
 
As the second OpenMoko phone, the Freerunner, came to market in mid-2008, the 
mailing list began to include many messages from people who had purchased 
OpenMoko phones and been disappointed. The references to these ‘wronged 
consumers’ reiterated a particular set of moral positions related to consumerism and 
consumption, including expectations that something one buys or pays for works 
without repair or maintenance. Regular contributors mostly ignored these new 
posters, trying to bury their frustration with their non-functional devices in detailed 
discussions of battery life or software upgrades. Yet the wronged consumers claimed 
the space of moral legitimacy in relation to legitimacy of contemporary market 
capitalism, strengthening the market dimension of value:  
 
Third request: what *is* the warranty on the Freerunner? 
The warranty is essentially non-existent. 
It's supposedly 14 days "D.O.A.". Dead On Arrival, in its strictest definition, 
means that as long as the phone boots up, that's it. It doesn't matter if it's not 
really functional. As long as it boots up, it's technically not "DOA". 
If it can't make phone calls or connect to the internet, too bad: it's not "DOA". 
If the GPS antenna doesn't work right, because of a hardware flaw, too bad: it's 
not “DOA". While I'm glad they're trying to put out a phone that's "open", I'm 
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very disappointed in their lack of customer support. I mean, it's not some 
throw-away piece of crap. It's a $400 phone! 
(August 2008)  
 
As these kinds of postings started replacing the earlier postings that stressed the 
capacity for open-source processes to challenge or transform competitive and market-
based forms of technology production, the capacity of open source to create 
‘rightness’ seemed to weaken. The OpenMoko mailing list slowly shifted from a site 
of intense discussion of open source possibilities to troubleshooting of malfunctioning 
phones, interspersed with offers to fix bugs and calls to vote on particular future 
features.  Bug fixing, a necessary process in software development, is also more 
difficult in hardware design, and providing adequate levels of documentation such 
that people could repair hardware rather than report bugs. Interestingly, it is this turn 
in the discussion that suggests how peer production’s more radical side might garner 
greater legitimacy. Faced with a product that could not challenge a commercial 
market leader, group members turned to focus on processes of repair. Discussions also 
connected the repair of bugs and failing hardware with the core principles of creating 
a shared commons of knowledge, and expanding the principles of free software: 
 
What OpenMoko needs is our help fixing what we can do, while they 
concentrate on fixing what only they can fix . . .  
Right now a lot of positive action is needed. If OpenMoko "dies" the 
hardware problems will NEVER be fixed, and the Free Software phone fails 
totally. (October 2008) 
 
As the OpenMoko project waned, it fragmented. The hardware failed to dominate the 
market but remained as a project undertaken by a network of participants – 
MORAL ORDERS IN CONTRIBUTION CULTURES 23 
maintaining camaraderie by sustaining discussions about how to put open-source 
values into practice. The software, by contrast, eventually made its way into the 
Android devices that compete in the smartphone market. This consolidation of open-
source work into a commercial product might be seen as appropriation as in the 
neoliberal critique of capitalism discussed earlier, if not for the fact that many of the 
OpenMoko community’s arguments concerned getting software to function RIGHT in 
order to share this good functioning with the world. Within the group’s own 
operational pragmatics, the integration of their software was depicted as a triumph of 
its production process and quality. 
 
Discussion 
The OpenMoko community conflated a number of forms of ‘goodness’, including 
well-functioning technology, well-made arguments, and well-intentioned social 
values. The difficulties in sorting out the different elements of this conflation have 
perhaps influenced the long-term consequences of this project in open source 
hardware and software development. Android, which appropriated much of the 
software developed in OpenMoko, uses a ‘platform model’ to encourage individual 
contributors (the kinds of people who might previously have participated in an open-
source project like OpenMoko) to build apps on a Google platform (Powell, 2015b). 
App developers are bound by the terms and conditions set for them by the owners of 
the platforms and set out in software development kit licenses (SDKs)
5
 that define 
how applications must be programmed. These SDKs can be highly restrictive. 
Google's Android SDK clearly stipulates that the finished app is the property of 
                                                 
5
 An SDK is a set of software development tools that permit the development of an 
application for a particular platform. An SDK includes tools for technical integration 
of the application, as well as specifying arrangements for intellectual property and 
payment relating to application development. 
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Android or parent company Alphabet, not the developer. The OpenMoko community 
remains divided as to the moral status of this integration with Android: some are 
enthusiastic about OpenMoko being part of Android because it keeps the software 
running.  
 
The analysis of the Open Moko case suggests that looking at values in design is not 
always enough; nor is only examining virtues in terms of the self-development of 
individuals. The excerpts presented here show how the OpenMoko community 
developed operational pragmatics that appear to have collapsed liberal political values 
design principles and specialist expertise into justifications that unfolded in relation to 
technical and rhetorical claims. This may be one reason that, for all the bluster about 
the transformative capacities of open-source technologies and participatory processes, 
they are often limited in their long-term impact. This may be because the participants 
conflate the ‘goodness’ of market success with the ‘goodness’ of accessible source 
code, and the ‘goodness’ of an impassioned mailing list discussion. Nevertheless, by 
treating these as regimes of justification following Boltanski and Chiapello, we can 
see their social value beyond the individual and beyond the structural process of 
appropriation into capitalism. Operation pragmatics focusing on function also open a 
space for the celebration and accommodation of repair, through bug fixing as 
discussed here and, more profoundly, through the release of electronics schematics 
that permit people to understand and repair their electronics. As a response to a 
‘broken world’, operational pragmatism is a construct which also connects with the 
capacity for function to become valuable beyond marketability – even if this value 
was never realized in the OpenMoko project. 
 
Conclusion 
Comment [M2]: Do you need to 
explain earlier how moral values differ 
from virtues? 
Comment [M3]: Discursive? 
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Regarding participatory culture’s values  as virtues expressed within a self-defined 
liberal space that always tends towards bureaucracy or becomes appropriated or 
enfolded into an intransigent neoliberalism makes it difficult to acknowledge the way 
that participatory producers justify and advocate competing moral positions. Some of 
these positions do indeed celebrate the benefits of competition, depicted in relation to 
the moral value of building well running things, but others justify their commitment 
to the openness of knowledge in reference to the same idea of ‘working right.’ These 
justifications are not always made on the basis of principle, and they do advance 
different moral ends.  
 
These moral ends enfold two co-articulating dimensions of value and advance them 
through operational pragmatics that embed arguments about worth into arguments 
about function. As this paper has shown, claims about principles like openness are 
advanced in relation to their benefit to consumers or ‘non-expert’ users as well as in 
relation to their capacity to keep knowledge free. While this rhetorical position always 
embeds some compromise, material considerations like the capacity for repair may 
hold more capacity to challenge the potential monopolization of the information 
world.  
“Good” technical function contributes to a set of justifications both for the idea of 
market-competitive products and for the design process remaining open enough that 
some people (even if expert) might contribute. This demonstrates the enfolding of the 
two dimension of value – market and commons – as well as the contingency that 
arises from operation pragmatics framing value in relation to function. The 
pragmatics advanced by the OpenMoko participants have some expansiveness as 
concerns repairability but also constraints that stem from the belief in function as 
Comment [M4]: The virtues 
themselves are rather all 
encompassingly broad! 
Comment [M5]: Normative principle 
or the open principle? Open? 
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paramount. Building phones, like building any digital communication infrastructure, 
requires constant repair, creating a justification for keeping information resources 
accessible and beyond the control of monopolies, invoking Jackson’s movement at 
the margins which can opened up by privileging the material practice of repairability.  
 
 
 
 
The expansion of participatory processes has transformed the software and hardware 
?production industry. While the analytical focus is often on how the industry 
appropriates the labour of peer-producers (Gillespie, 2011), the framing of these 
developments in this paper highlights that this shift comes about through the great 
accessibility of knowledge about, and participation within, these production processes 
especially when they are ‘open’. Thus, within the operation of platform capitalism 
there is a baseline of participatory collaboration that is understood and justified by its 
community members as morally valuable, both because it helps to make things that 
work and because it helps to keep knowledge open. These moral positions, contrary to 
critical perspectives that stress their recuperation by the market, bureaucracy or the 
new spirit of capitalism, hold the potential for an alternative and transformative 
perspective.  Seeing participation only as a means of enacting virtues stops short of 
seeing how values or virtues are constructed and justified. Regimes of justification 
can work pragmatically to advance some considerations over others; these can 
articular different dimensions of value that shape how we apprehend our spaces of 
communication and culture. 
 
Comment [M6]: On knowledge what? 
Production? 
I think you could strengthen the 
conclusion:  you don’t really mention 
the flexibility of regimes of capitalism 
discussed earlier, nor do you mention 
the orders of worth.  If it is the case 
that the Boltanski framing is also 
critiqued something should be said 
about that since you seem to depart 
from the new spirit of capitalism 
argument.  Above I’ve meddled a bit 
to try to highlight your own construct. 
You might want to say more about 
how it does/does not complement the 
Virtues analysis. I’m not quite clear 
whether you want to depart from that 
entirely or not.  If you do, then that 
needs to be clearer. 
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